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NOVAK V. COMMONWEALTH: ARE VIRGINIA COURTS
PROVIDING SPECIAL PROTECTION TO VIRGINIA'S
JUVENILE DEFENDANTS?
"What transpired would make us pause for careful inquiry if
a mature man were involved. And when, as here, a mere
child-an easy victim of the law-is before us, special care
in scrutinizing the record must be used. Age 15 is a tender
and difficult age for a boy of any race. He cannot be judged
by the more exacting standards of maturity. That which
would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and
overwhelm a lad in his early teens."
Justice Douglas1
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 9, 1991, Shawn Paul Novak was charged with the
murder of two young boys, Daniel Grier, age nine, and Christo-
pher Weaver, age seven.2 The boys had disappeared on March
4 and their bodies were found the next day after an extensive
search.' The police inquiry into the murders led to the ques-
tioning of a number of people, including Shawn, then age six-
teen.4 Shawn was questioned on four separate occasions.5 At
no time prior to, during, or after any of these questioning ses-
sions was Shawn read his Miranda warnings which specify the
rights to which he was entitled under the Constitution. It was
during the fifth and final interrogation session that Shawn
finally confessed to the murders.6 After approximately thirty
minutes of questioning, the detective persuaded Mrs. Novak to
leave the interrogation room.' He assured her that her son was
1. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948).
2. Novak v. Commonwealth, 457 S.E.2d 402 (Va. Ct. App. 1995).
3. I& at 405.
4. I&
5. Id
6. Id.
7. Brief of Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Youth Advocacy Clinic and Mental Dis-
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not a suspect, but that he had "sensitive areas" that needed to
be discussed which were in no way related to the murders.'
Almost two hours later, the Detective said, "Shawn. You can
talk to me. Don't be afraid. Get it out. Don't be afraid... You
killed them, didn't you?"9 It was not until Shawn answered
"yes" that the Detective read him his Miranda rights for the
first time. °
Shawn was seventeen years old when he was transferred
from Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court and con-
victed in circuit court as an adult in 1992.1 On May 23, 1995,
the Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the conviction of
Shawn Paul Novak on two counts of capital murder. 2 It was
the first time in Virginia's appellate history that a juvenile's
conviction based on a confession he gave police without previ-
ously receiving a Miranda warning, was upheld. 13 In March
1996, the Supreme Court of Virginia denied Shawn's petition to
review the Court of Appeals' decision.
For years, the Virginia appellate court system has given lip
service to the notion that juveniles require special care and
attention from the justice system.'4 However, in the Novak
abilities Clinic University of Richmond Law School at 3, Novak v. Commonwealth,
457 S.E.2d 402 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (No. 1416-92-1) [hereinafter Brief].
8. Brief, supra note 7, at 3.
9. Id. at 23.
10. Novak, 457 S.E.2d at 405.
11. Brief, supra note 7, at 1.
12. Novak, 457 S.E.2d 402.
13. But see Wansley v. Commonwealth, 171 S.E.2d 678 (Va.), cert. denied, 399
U.S. 931 (1970) (holding that Miranda does not apply to a situation where confession
was freely given by defendant to his mother); Williams v. Commonwealth, 179 S.E.2d
512, 514 (Va. 1971) (upholding Wansley because Miranda is "limited to statements
resulting from the compelling influences of police interrogation.").
14. See Green v. Commonwealth, 292 S.E.2d 605, 608 (Va. 1982) ("[Ilt appears
the police exercised the greatest care in seeing Green's rights were protected."); Har-
ris v. Commonwealth, 232 S.E.2d 751, 754 (Va. 1977) ("Today, as a result of Miranda
v. Arizona . . . and In re Gault, . . . juveniles are fully advised of their Miranda
rights.-).
In Grogg v. Commonwealth, 371 S.E.2d 549 (Va. Ct. App. 1988), the Court of
Appeals of Virginia noted that:
Even though the United States Supreme Court and our Supreme Court
have adopted the totality of the circumstances approach, many courts
have cautioned that greater protection and care may be required when a
juvenile is involved. . . .We adhere to the view that it is desirable to
have a parent, counsel or some other interested adult or guardian pres-
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decision, and the five main cases preceding Novak, which all
dealt with questionable confessions by juveniles, the Court of
Appeals of Virginia and the Supreme Court of Virginia upheld
the convictions every time.'5 Those five cases are underscored
by two others where the court upheld juvenile convictions based
on confessions and admissions made to parents after police
interrogation." What is most troubling about this string of
cases is that they seem to contradict one of the most significant
juvenile law opinions ever written by the United States Su-
preme Court. In In re Gault, the Court stated that when a ju-
venile confesses, "the greatest care must be taken to assure
that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it
was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the prod-
uct of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or
despair."'
This Note discusses the Fifth Amendment right to avoid self-
incrimination and how that right applies to the juvenile defen-
dant. Part J1 examines the United States Supreme Court cases
which have had a substantial impact on state court decisions
pertaining to confessions by juveniles and the rights to which
they are entitled. Part III discusses the Virginia decisions lead-
ing up to Novak, and Part IV discusses the Novak decision
itself. Part V provides a general analysis of the reliability of
juvenile confessions, and Part VI concludes by addressing the
likely outcomes of the juvenile confession cases following Novak.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S TREATMENT OF JUVENILES
In 1966, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case
Miranda v. Arizona.'" Miranda was a 5-4 response to a ques-
tion posed twenty-two years earlier by Justice Jackson's dissent
ent when the police interrogate a juvenile, and it is even more desirable
to have an interested adult present when a juvenile waives fundamental
constitutional rights and confesses to a serious crime.
Id. at 556-57.
15. Thomas v. Commonwealth, 419 S.E.2d 606 (Va. 1992); Harris, 232 S.E.2d at
751; Johnson v. Commonwealth, 404 S.E.2d 384 (Va. Ct. App. 1991); Smith v. Com-
monwealth, 373 S.E.2d 340 (Va. 1988); Grogg, 371 S.E.2d at 549.
16. Williams, 179 S.E.2d 512; Wansley, 171 S.E.2d 678.
17. 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967).
18. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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in Ashcraft v. Tennessee.19 In Ashcraft, Justice Jackson agreed
with the majority that the detention and questioning of a sus-
pect for thirty-six hours is "inherently coercive," but also said,
"[s]o is custody and examination for one hour. Arrest itself is
inherently coercive and so is detention.... But does the Con-
stitution prohibit use of all confessions made after arrest be-
cause questioning, while one is deprived of freedom, is 'inher-
ently coercive'?""
In Miranda, Jackson's question was finally answered. The
Court held that an individual who is subject to custodial inter-
rogation by law enforcement officers must be advised of certain
basic rights before the interrogation may commence. 2 The pur-
pose of this procedure, the Court stated, is to "assure that the
individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment
to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate him-
self."
22
"Custodial interrogation" is defined as the "questioning initi-
ated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way."2' The administration of Miranda warn-
ings is not required unless this definition is met.24 Not every
individual questioned by the police is necessarily subject to
custodial interrogation.2 5 The critical test to determine if custo-
dial interrogation exists is whether a reasonable person in the
suspect's position would have understood his situation as being
custodial,26 or in other words, that he was not free to leave.
In Miranda, the Court specifically addressed the procedures
which law enforcement officers must take when interrogating
an individual: "The person must be warned that he has a right
to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used
as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the pres-
19. 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
20. Id. at 161.
21. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 444.
24. Id.
25. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984).
26. Id.
[Vol. 30:935
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ence of an attorney, either retained or appointed."2 The Court
made it clear that these rights could be waived, but only if the
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligentlyY In
the years following Miranda, there has been much debate as to
what constitutes a valid waiver of rights.29 As will be dis-
cussed later, this battle still rages in Virginia.
After Miranda, the question remained whether the decision
applied with respect to the interrogation and subsequent convic-
tion of juveniles. 0 One year later in 1967, the Court decided
In re Gault,"' a holding which overturned the Supreme Court
of Arizona's decision to commit a fifteen-year-old boy to the
State Industrial School for making obscene phone calls to a
woman who lived in his neighborhood. 2 The Court began its
opinion by discussing the history of the juvenile justice system.
"From the inception of the juvenile court system, wide differenc-
es have been tolerated-indeed insisted upon-between the
procedural rights accorded to adults and those of juveniles."3
The Court went on to describe the common law view of
children's rights.
The right of the state ... to deny to the child procedural
rights available to his elders was elaborated by the asser-
tion that a child, unlike an adult, has a right "not to liberty
but to custody" . . . [i]f the child is "delinquent"... the
state may intervene. In doing so, it does not deprive the
child of any rights, because he has none. It merely provides
the "custody" to which the child is entitled.34
The Court recognized that the juvenile system was set up
without many procedural restraints specifically for the purpose
of providing children with more care and compassion than the
27. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436.
28. Id at 479.
29. See, e.g., Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 30 (1976) (holding that confession made
pursuant to a plea bargain was admissible because "[t]he confession [did] not appear
to have been the result of... any coercion on the part of the prosecution, and was
not involuntary.").
30. In Miranda, there was no discussion of juvenile case law. 384 U.S. at 436.
31. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
32. Id. at 4.
33. Id. at 14.
34. Id. at 17.
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adult system provides.35 However, it found that "[t]he absence
of substantive standards has not necessarily meant that chil-
dren receive careful, compassionate, individualized treat-
ment.... Departures from established principles of due process
have frequently resulted not in enlightened procedure, but in
arbitrariness."36 The Court also reviewed the purpose and ne-
cessity of due process of law:
Failure to observe the fundamental requirements of due
process has resulted in instances .. .of unfairness to indi-
viduals and inadequate or inaccurate findings of fact and
unfortunate prescriptions of remedy. Due process of law is
the primary and indispensable foundation of individual
freedom. It is the basic and essential term in the social
compact which defines the rights of the individual and
delimits the powers which the state may exercise."
Although it never decided the precise question of whether a
juvenile is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of due pro-
cess, the Court had emphasized in previous decisions "that 'the
basic requirements of due process and fairness' be satisfied in
such proceedings .. . [N]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor
the Bill of Rights is for adults alone." 8 The Court felt that
"lilt would indeed be surprising if the privilege against self-
incrimination were available to hardened criminals but not to
children. The language of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to
the States by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment, is un-
equivocal and without exception."39 From this, the Court con-
cluded that if a juvenile was entitled to the privilege against
self-incrimination like an adult, he was also capable of waiving
that right.40
35. Id. at 15.
36. Id. at 18-19.
37. Id. at 19-20.
38. Id. at 12-13 (quoting Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948)).
39. Id. at 47.
40. Id. at 55-57. The Court also examined the specific question "whether. . . an
admission by the juvenile may be used against him in the absence of clear and un-
equivocal evidence that the admission was made with knowledge that he was not
obliged to speak and would not be penalized for remaining silent." Id. at 44. In addi-
tion, the Court considered "whether, if the privilege against self-incrimination is avail-
able, it can effectively be waived unless counsel is present or the right to counsel has
been waived." Id.
940
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The Court in In re Gault "emphasized that admissions and
confessions of juveniles require special caution."4' In previous
decisions, the Court noted the peculiar vulnerability of
youths.42 In Gallegos v. Colorado, for example, the Court re-
peated its concern for the juvenile defendant, originally ex-
pressed in Haley:
[A] 14-year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated, is unlikely
to have any conception of what will confront him when he
is made accessible only to the police. That is to say, we
deal with a person who is not equal to the police in knowl-
edge and understanding of the consequences of the ques-
tions and answers being recorded and who is unable to
know how to protect his own interests or how to get the
benefits of his constitutional rights.'
The Gault decision emphasized that the importance of the
due process privilege, especially as it related to juveniles is "to
prevent the state, whether by force or by psychological domina-
tion, from overcoming the mind and will of the person under
investigation and depriving him of the freedom to decide wheth-
er to assist the state in securing his conviction."" Since the In
re Gault decision, it has been presumed in many states, includ-
ing Virginia, that due process applies to juveniles as well as
adults.' Therefore, juvenile defendants in Virginia are to be
given Miranda warnings whenever they are taken into custody
as suspects of a crime."6
41. Id. at 45.
42. An example of the Court's concern is expressed by Justice Douglas in Haley
v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948), at the beginning of this Note.
43. 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962).
44. Gault, 387 U.S. at 47.
45. See, e.g., Harris v. Commonwealth, 232 S.E.2d 751, 754 (Va. 1977) ("Today, as
a result of Miranda v. Arizona ... and In re Gault . .. juveniles are fully advised
of their Miranda rights. .. ."); Williams v. Commonwealth, 179 S.E.2d 512 (Va. 1971)
(upholding previous decision in Wansley v. Commonwealth, 121 S.E.2d at 678 (Va.
1970), that although Miranda and its sister cases are not applicable where a juvenile
confesses to a third party, Miranda is applicable to juvenile confession cases where
the statements are made directly to the police).
46. See Green v. Commonwealth, 292 S.E.2d 605, 606 (Va. 1982) ("Detectives ...
[arrested] Green, a fifteen year old student.... ER]eading from the standard form,
[the detective] immediately advised Green of his Miranda rights and told him he was
a suspect in a 'purse snatching."); Smith v. Commonwealth, 373 S.E.2d 340, 341 (Va.
Ct. App. 1988) ("Shortly after the victim's body was found [olfficers ... interviewed
[Smith] at his home.... Immediately upon approaching [Smith], [the officers] ...
1996] 941
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In the 1979 case Fare v. Michael C., 47 the United States Su-
preme Court came one step closer to confirming that juveniles
are entitled to receive Miranda warnings before being interro-
gated by law enforcement officials. Fare also confirmed that a
juvenile is as capable as an adult of waiving those rights."
The test to determine whether an individual has voluntarily
waived his Fifth Amendment rights is whether the statement
was the "'product of an essentially free and unconstrained
choice by its maker,' or ... whether the maker's will has been
overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically im-
paired."49 As the Court points out in Fare, whether an individ-
ual has knowingly and intelligently waived his rights is deter-
mined by using the "totality of the circumstances test."5 °
The totality approach ... mandates ... inquiry into all
the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. This in-
cludes evaluation of the juvenile's age, experience, educa-
tion, background, and intelligence, and into whether he has
the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the
nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequenc-
es of waiving those rights.5
In Fare, the United States Supreme Court confirmed the
tests and the factors that the state courts must use in their
juvenile decisions." As we shall see in Virginia however, al-
though these tests are used regularly, the protection they pro-
vide for juveniles is minimal when compared to the special care
and protection the Supreme Court deemed necessary in earlier
cases such as Gault and Gallegos.
advised him of his 'rights under Miranda' as contained on a card read into evi-
dence."); see also, Brief, supra note 7, at 7 ("Virginia decisions require compliance
with Miranda for statements admitted in criminal proceedings after transfer from
juvenile court to circuit courts for trial as adults.").
47. 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
48. Id. at 725.
49. Stockton v. Commonwealth, 314 S.E.2d 371, 381 (Va. 1984) (quoting
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973)).
50. Fare, 442 U.S. at 725.
51. Id. (citing North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 367 (1979)).
52. Id.
942
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III. VIRGINIA'S TREATMENT OF JUVENILES
A. Harris v. Commonwealth
In 1977, seven years after the Supreme Court of Virginia
established that Miranda applied to juvenile as well as adult
suspects,53 Virginia confronted the first case in which they ac-
tually had to determine whether a juvenile confession subject to
Miranda had been properly admitted into evidence. In Harris v.
Commonwealth,' a juvenile charged with first degree murder
and robbery was given his Miranda warnings and then con-
fessed to the police.55 On appeal of his conviction, Harris ar-
gued that his confession was not voluntarily given because he
was not aware that he would be treated as an adult.56 Harris
argued that, "the mere warning that his statement could be
used against him in 'a court of law' was not sufficiently specific
to alert a juvenile to the fact that he might be tried as an
adult."57 The court found, however, that under the totality of
the circumstances test, Harris had been fully advised of his
constitutional rights and had waived those rights freely and
voluntarily.58 Harris was seventeen at the time of questioning;
53. See Wansley, 121 S.E.2d 678 (Va. 1970).
54. Harris v. Commonwealth, 232 S.E.2d 751 (Va. 1977).
55. Id. at 753. While en route by bus from juvenile halfway house in Staunton to
Beaumont Learning Center near Richmond, Harris escaped in Charlottesville. He
broke into his grandfather's house and murdered him. Using the same gun, he later
robbed a market in Charlottesville. Before any questioning by the police, Harris
signed a waiver of rights form. After he signed the form, "he confessed fully, freely
and in detail to the two crimes that he had committed." Id.
56. Id. The court notes that:
Harris argues that the voluntariness of his confession is clouded, not by
the use of threats or coercion on the part of the police, but because he
was laboring under a serious misconception concerning the probable dis-
position of his case .... [H]e had no expectation that he would be treat-
ed as an adult.
Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 755.
The interrogation of defendant was conducted by the police officers
in an adversary setting in police headquarters. The defendant knew that
the crimes being investigated were murder and armed robbery and that
he was a suspect. He had been so advised in writing and the form that
he executed prior to questioning clearly set forth his rights to remain
silent, to have counsel and to stop answering any questions whenever he
so desired. His mother was present. The juvenile authorities were not
944 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:935
he had almost completed the seventh grade in public schools;
and he had attended the Hanover School for Boys and the
Beaumont Learning Center, two correctional institutions where
he had previously been confined. The murder and armed rob-
bery "were but the last two acts in a juvenile delinquent's ca-
reer which had already precipitated the filing of thirty juvenile
petitions against [Harris]." 9 The court felt that because of
these circumstances, Harris had accumulated enough experience
to know that he could be treated as an adult." The Supreme
Court of Virginia upheld his conviction based on the fact that
Harris knowingly and voluntarily waived his Fifth Amendment
rights.6 1
B. Grogg v. Commonwealth
In 1988, the Virginia courts were again confronted with a
confession made by a juvenile after waiving his Fifth Amend-
ment Miranda rights.62 In Grogg v. Commonwealth, the Court
of Appeals of Virginia upheld the conviction of Thomas Lynn
Grogg, a juvenile charged with first degree murder and use of a
present and did not participate in the interrogation.
Id.
59. Id. at 751.
On ten occasions Harris had been found not innocent of charges that
would have been felonies if committed by an adult. On thirteen occasions
he had been found not innocent of charges that would have been misde-
meanors if committed by an adult. On one occasion he had been given a
six-month jail sentence. The crimes with which he had been previously
charged include statutory burglary, larceny of automobiles, larceny from
persons, destruction of private property, assault and battery, impeding a
police officer, drunk in public, stabbing with intent to maim and kill, pro-
fanely swearing and cursing in public, hit and run, operating a vehicle
without an operator's license, reckless driving, and sodomy.
Id.
60. Id.
The previous exposure of defendant to Virginia's criminal justice system,
as well as the warnings that his statement could and would be used
against him in a court of law, clearly conveyed to defendant the possibili-
ty of subsequent criminal prosecution. Indeed it would have been naive
for one to believe that with this background Harris did not realize that
he could be tried in the circuit court and subjected to confinement in a
penitentiary.
Id.
61. Id.
62. Grogg v. Commonwealth, 371 S.E.2d 549, 550 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
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firearm in the cdmmission of murder.63 Grogg was given his
Miranda warnings on five separate occasions, but argued that
his confession was obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment
rights." Grogg argued that, "because his court-appointed attor-
ney was not notified or present and his parents or other neu-
tral adult were not present," his waiver of constitutional rights
was not knowing and intelligent.65 The court used the totality
of the circumstances test when it found that, although
it is desirable to have a parent, counsel or some other inter-
ested adult or guardian present when the police interrogate
a juvenile, and it is even more desirable to have an inter-
ested adult present when a juvenile waives his fundamental
constitutional rights and confesses to a serious crime, . . . it
is well established that the mere absence of a parent or
counsel does not render a waiver invalid.66
Rather, the absence of a parent is merely one factor to be con-
sidered in the totality of the circumstances.67 The court found
that because no member of Grogg's family was available and
the fact that no family member was present did not render the
confession inadmissible." The court also found Grogg's claim
that the interrogation atmosphere was coercive was without
63. Id. at 550-51. Grogg was initially arrested in Sarasota, Florida. The Sarasota
police were alerted to "an outstanding Virginia warrant charging Grogg with grand
larceny of an automobile. At that time, Grogg was nine days shy of his sixteenth
birthday." Grogg was taken into custody in Florida as a fugitive from justice. Grogg
was advised of his rights under Miranda, and then gave a statement to the Sarasota
police. Within forty-eight hours, Grogg signed a waiver of extradition and was re-
turned to Virginia. Id.
64. Id. at 554. Grogg also argued that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was
violated and that "pertinent Florida and Virginia statutes were violated by the police"
during the extradition process. Id.
65. Id at 557. Grogg also argued that the facility where he was held, an adult
facility, "created an atmosphere of coercion and pressure" and that the police who
read him his Miranda warnings did so "without conducting colloquy to determine
whether he fully understood the rights that he ultimately waived." Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. "The absence of a parent or counsel is 'a circumstance that weigh[s]
against the admissibility of the confession." Id. (quoting Miller v. Maryland, 577 F.2d
1158, 1159 (4th Cir. 1978)).
68. Id. at 557. At the time of the confession, Grogg was in Florida and his par-
ents were in Virginia. His mother did not have a phone, and his father could not be
reached. Grogg declined the opportunity to contact his sister. Id.
1996] 945
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merit.69 Grogg was not handcuffed; the interrogation itself last-
ed only about one hour; Grogg was calm; no officer threatened
him in any way; and "no promises or inducements were made
to elicit his confession." ° The court looked to Grogg's educa-
tional experience and found that, at the time of questioning, he
had completed the seventh grade and was within one week of
his sixteenth birthday.7 He was in good health and was not
using any drugs or alcohol.72 He had appeared one time previ-
ously in juvenile court.73 He was advised of his Miranda warn-
ings on five separate occasions.74 The waiver and consent form
he signed contained simple, easy to understand language.75
After Grogg was read each right, he was asked generally if he
had any questions.76 The court found no evidence in the record
that Grogg failed to understand his Miranda rights.77 There-
fore, the court found that under the totality of the circumstanc-
es, there was no reason to find Grogg's confession inadmissi-
ble.7"
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. A Wechsler Intelligence test indicated that Grogg's level of cognitive func-
tioning fell within average range. His verbal comprehension ability fell within the low
average range, and his perceptual organizational ability fell within the high average
range. Id. at 553.
73. Id. at 557.
74. Id. at 558. Grogg was first informed of his Miranda rights immediately after
he was arrested, and then again approximately three hours later, before the Sarasota
police took a statement from him. The judge, at a subsequent advisory proceeding,
read Grogg his rights, and his court-appointed attorney also reviewed Grogg's rights
with him. Finally, when the Virginia police officers arrived, they also advised Grogg
of his rights. Id.
75. Id. "The waiver and consent form that Grogg signed indicated the officers
were investigating [sic] homicide and Officer Hughes specifically asked Grogg if he
understood what the word 'homicide' meant. Grogg acknowledged that he did." Id.
76. Id. "[T]he record discloses that the officers made a conscientious effort to
ensure that he understood his rights." Id.
77. Id. In fact, during cross-examination at a pre-trial hearing, Grogg indicated
that at the time he spoke with the police officer, he "knew [he] could say nothing"
but he "really wanted to get [it] off [his] chest." Id.
78. Id. at 559.
In view of the totality of the circumstances, we believe that Grogg was of
sufficient age, intelligence, and experience to understand the rights he
was waiving and the consequences of the waiver. Furthermore, it is ap-
parent that the waiver was voluntary because no coercion or threats were
implied by the police, and the interrogation was not lengthy.
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C. Smith v. Commonwealth
In the same year Grogg was decided, the Court of Appeals of
Virginia also heard Smith v. Commonwealth."9 Once again the
court decided that under the totality of the circumstances, the
confession given by the juvenile was admissible at trial."0 In
Smith, a fifteen-year-old boy was charged with first degree
murder, aggravated sexual battery, and abduction.8 Shortly
after the victim's body was found, police went to Smith's home
to question him. 2 As soon as Smith answered the door, the
police read him his Miranda rights." When asked if he wished
to make a statement to the police, Smith simply responded
"prove it."" In the car on the way to the station, the officer
asked Smith if he understood that he did not have to answer
questions or make a statement without a lawyer being pres-
ent." Smith "indicated that he understood and proceeded to
tell [the officer] that after having sex with the victim he struck
her with rocks at least twice; that he choked her; that he...
dragged her down a hill to a ditch; and that when [he] left her
79. 373 S.E.2d 340 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
80. Id- at 343.
The record discloses that appellant was advised of his rights several
times in different locations and by at least two different officers out of
each other's presence. Following each warning, appellant chose to give an
account of the cause of the victim's death which clearly proved his guilt
of each crime for which he stands convicted. There is no evidence of
police intimidation, subtle or otherwise, which could reasonably be said to
overcome appellant's free choice. There is no evidence that appellant was
"threatened, tricked or cajoled." In fact, appellant declined the police offer
to have his parents present when questioned at the sheriffs office. At no
time did [Smith] request that an attorney be appointed or present when
questioned.
Id.
81. Id. at 341. The victim was a twelve-year old girl who was found dead in the
woods near her home. She was only "partially clothed, her 'bottom bare.'.. . The
cause of death was trauma associated with a skull fracture." Id.
82. Id Police were alerted to Smith's involvement in the murder by the victim's
grandmother who saw Smith running away from the scene. Id.
83. Id. at 341-42.
84. Id- at 342. After accompanying Smith upstairs so that he could get dressed,
the police officers handcuffed him and drove him to the police station. Before they
left, the police explained to Smith's parents that he was under arrest for murder and
they could be present when he was interrogated. Neither parent chose to follow the
police to the precinct. Id.
85. Id.
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she was dead."" The court found that the totality of the cir-
cumstances indicated that Smith was read his Miranda rights
on a number of occasions by a number of different people.87
Each time he chose to give a statement to the police.88 The
court ultimately held "that viewing the totality of the circum-
stances and particular facts disclosed by this record, the evi-
dence is sufficient to support the trial court's judgment that
appellant was fully advised of his rights and by his conduct and
statements waived his privilege against self-incrimination.""
D. Johnson v. Commonwealth
In 1991, the Court of Appeals of Virginia was again faced
with a case involving a juvenile confession given after Miranda
rights were read. In Johnson v. Commonwealth,9" a fifteen-
year-old male was charged with murder." Using the totality of
the circumstances test, the court held that Johnson's confession
to the police was freely and voluntarily made. Johnson was
capable of reading and writing at a seventh grade level and
suffered from no physical or mental disabilities." Before the
police began questioning him, Johnson was advised of his
Miranda rights. 3 Both Johnson and his father indicated that
they understood the warnings, and that they were both willing
86. Id.
87. Id. at 342. Once he reached the police station, Smith was once again remind-
ed of his Miranda rights. The officer asked Smith if he wished to make a statement
and Smith replied, "No, sir." But shortly thereafter, he began repeating the same
story he had told in the car. Next, Smith was placed in the custody of two other law
enforcement officers. He was again read his rights, and after indicating that he un-
derstood those rights, he retold the entire story. Id.
88. Id. at 343. The court held that Smith's response "prove it" was "simply a non-
responsive exclamation that was insufficient to cut-off further questioning." With re-
gard to Smith's answer, "no sir" when asked after giving the story in the car whether
he would like to make a statement, the court held that "in view of appellant's prior
admissions, the trial court reasonably interpreted the latter question as one of clarifi-
cation." Id.
89. Id.
90. 404 S.E.2d 384 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
91. Id. at 385. The defendant arrived at the police station accompanied by his
father, an ordained minister. Earlier in the day, defendant told his cousin that he
had killed the victim using a .22 caliber weapon while attempting to rob him. Id.
92. Id. Johnson was described by his former teacher as the best student in her
class. Id.
93. Id
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to answer questions regarding the murder. 4 Johnson was not
overly sleepy nor did he show signs of being under the influ-
ence of any drugs or alcohol.95 The court found no evidence in
the record of threats, force or display of weapons by the po-
lice.96 The only questionable conduct by the police occurred
when "[o]ne officer was less than truthful when he led appel-
lant to believe that he had obtained incriminating finger-
prints."97 The court held that "[wlhile we do not condone con-
duct wherein false representations are made, the statement
made by the officer did not constitute reversible error.""s Rath-
er the court felt that misconduct on the part of the police is one
factor to be considered in the totality of the circumstances.99
The court held that because of the juvenile defendant's age,
background, experience and conduct, the trial court was correct
in finding his confession admissible."'0
E. Thomas v. Commonwealth
Most recently, in 1992, the Supreme Court of Virginia was
called upon to decide whether the confession of a juvenile de-
fendant was admissible under the totality of the circumstances.
In Thomas v. Commonwealth,"' the court reviewed the convic-
tion of a seventeen year old male for the murder of his
girlfriend's parents.0 2 On appeal, Thomas argued that an ex-
amination of the totality of the circumstances indicated that his
94. Id at 385-86. Initially, Johnson denied that he was involved in the murder,
but later he asked to speak with one of the officers alone. While he was talking with
that officer, Johnson confessed to the murder. Later, Johnson corroborated his oral
confession in a handwritten statement. Id.
95. Id. at 386.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 386 n.1.
99. Id. at 386.
100. Id- at 394.
101. 419 S.E.2d 606 (Va. 1992).
102. Id. Defendant was romantically involved with a fourteen-year-old girl named
Jessica. Jessica's parents were threatening to break up the relationship for some
time, and Jessica was heard to say that she wished to get rid of her parents. Thom-
as and Jessica formulated a plan. On the night of the murders, Thomas entered
Jessica's bedroom window at midnight, went to her parent's room and fired a shotgun
at them twice. Thomas returned home and was later questioned by the police regard-
ing his involvement in the murders. Id.
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confession was involuntary. First, he was only seventeen at the
time of the offense and was a high school dropout. 10 3 More im-
portantly, he argued, he had slept only two of the forty hours
preceding his interrogation."° He indicated that he felt pres-
sure from people he thought were very angry with him.0 5 In
addition, because the police initiated all conversations, Thomas
"felt surrounded by authorities who obviously wanted him to
confess."' 5 Also, according to the testimony of a clinical psy-
chologist, Thomas was unable to make an informed decision
about waiving his Miranda rights. 7 The doctor felt that
Thomas was "unable to make decisions at an adult level" due to
the fact that he was "at the lower end" of the "average range of
intellectual function" and was sleep-deprived.' ° Thomas ar-
gued, "it [was] unreasonable to believe that under these circum-
stances [his] confession ... was obtained by anything other
than coercion and duress."1°9
The court disagreed with Thomas' analysis of the situation.
Chief Justice Carrico, writing for the majority, examined the
totality of the circumstances."0 Justice Carrico first noted that
before interrogation commenced, Thomas was read his Miranda
rights "very slow[ly] and very deliberate[ly].""' Thomas indi-
cated that "he understood his rights, took time to read the
waiver form for himself, and then signed it."" Justice Carrico
noted that on the day of questioning, Thomas was, "[viery alert
and very calm."" 3 The court also noted that Thomas' "guard-
ian was present during the entire interview except for a few
seconds when she went to the kitchen to get a drink."" Fi-
103. Id. at 613.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. The psychologist diagnosed Thomas as being "developmentally immature."
Id.
108. Id. at 613.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 614.
111. Id. The record indicates that Special Agent Johnson, who took Thomas' confes-
sion, gave Thomas his Miranda warnings at approximately 2:00 p.m. on the afternoon
after the murders. Id. at 613.
112. Id. at 614.
113. Id. at 613-14. He "appeared alert and responsive, had no odor of alcohol
about him . . . and had not taken any drugs." Id.
114. Id.
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nally, the court noted that the Commonwealth's expert witness,
a clinical psychologist, felt that Thomas was capable of know-
ingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waiving his Miranda
rights."5 The trial court was completely within its discretion
when it rejected the testimony of the defense expert in favor of
the Commonwealth's expert."' Because the evidence in the re-
cord sufficiently supported the trial court's conclusion that
Thomas' confession was admissible, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia upheld Thomas' conviction."
It becomes disturbingly obvious after a quick glance at each
of these Virginia cases that all of the juveniles involved were
young people with serious problems in need of serious help.
They were all convicted of heinous crimes. Many had previous
experience with the juvenile justice system. They were not
typical kids. However, the fact remains that they were still
juveniles, still entitled to the extra care and protection dis-
cussed in In re Gault and Fare v. Michael C. Although few
would disagree that these juveniles deserved to be punished in
some way, most would agree that our nation's children need all
the protective devices our system can offer. In every one of the
previous Virginia cases, the juvenile had been read his Miranda
rights. And in every one, the totality of the circumstances test
provided a strong, if not conclusive, argument in favor of up-
holding the conviction based on the juvenile's waiver of his
Fifth Amendment rights. Novak v. Commonwealth, on the other
hand, presents an entirely different situation."'
IV. NOVAK V. COMMONWEALTH
A. An Analysis of the Facts
Unlike most of the defendants in the cases above, when
Shawn Paul Novak was convicted of murder in 1992, he had no
previous experience with the criminal justice system." He
115. Id. at 614.
116. Id.
117. Id. "[T]he evidence amply supports the trial court's finding that Thomas'
'rights were fully protected and that he made an effective, voluntary decision to make
the statement he did.'" Id.
118. 457 S.E.2d 402 (Va. Ct. App. 1995).
119. Brief, supra note 7, at 23. (Shawn had no previous contact with the juvenile
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suffered from severe mood swings and growing depression.'
He was known to exhibit bizarre behavior in his classes at
school.' 2 ' For instance, he talked to tennis balls, golf balls,
blades of grass, and an imaginary friend he called "Kender."'
One of Shawn's teachers relayed the fact that as Shawn became
more withdrawn, his mood swings would become more severe,
and he could often be found standing in a trash can in a dark
classroom. 2 a Shawn's teacher also indicated that he was an
overly obedient boy with respect to authority.' A defense
psychiatrist testified that Shawn was likely to be overly agree-
able and would try to please authority figures.' Both the de-
fense and prosecutorial psychiatrists agreed that Shawn was ex-
tremely immature and suffered from low self-esteem." Both
also indicated that Shawn's verbal interaction was often "gross-
ly inappropriate" to the circumstances surrounding him. 7
B. An Analysis of the Court's Reasoning
Also unlike any of the defendants discussed in the cases
above, Shawn's confession was given to the police before his
Miranda warnings were read to him. 8 The prosecution ar-
gued that this was due to the fact that Shawn was not yet
subject to custodial interrogation.'29 As noted in Berkemer v.
McCarty, the test to determine whether custodial interrogation
justice system, the police, or the courts). Id. But see supra, part III where all but two
of the juveniles in those cases had some sort of previous contact with the criminal
justice system.
120. Id. at 5. The only other juvenile defendant to offer evidence of emotional
instability in the cases discussed above was the defendant in Thomas v. Common-
wealth, 419 S.E.2d 606 (Va. 1992).
121. Brief, supra note 7, at 5.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Brief, supra note 7, at 5, 6.
127. Id. at 6. In none of the preceding five cases was similar behavior by the
defendant observed.
128. Novak, 457 S.E.2d at 405; see Thomas v. Commonwealth, 419 S.E.2d 606, 614
(Va. 1992); Harris v. Commonwealth, 232 S.E.2d 751, 753 (Va. 1977); Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 404 S.E.2d 384, 385-86 (Va. Ct. App. 1991); Smith v. Commonwealth,
373 S.E.2d 340, 341-42 (Va. Ct. App. 1988); Grogg v. Commonwealth, 371 S.E.2d 549,
551 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
129. Novak, 457 S.E.2d at 407-08.
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exists is whether a reasonable person in the suspect's position
would have understood his situation to be custodial. 130 There-
fore, the Court of Appeals of Virginia had to "determine how a
reasonable child of Novak's age would have understood his
predicament and acted in a manner consistent with that under-
standing."' 3' The court once again used the totality of the cir-
cumstances test: "In determining whether an individual was in
custody, a court must examine all of the circumstances sur-
rounding the interrogation, but the 'ultimate inquiry is simply
whether there [was] a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of
movement" of the degree associated with a formal arrest."32
The circumstances the court took into consideration were
Shawn's age, intelligence, background, and experience with the
criminal justice system, the police conduct, surroundings, physi-
cal restraint, length and character of the interrogation, and the
focus of police suspicion." The key factor to the outcome of
the appeal however, was the fact that the appellate court had
to review the evidence in the light most favorable to the pre-
vailing party in the court below." Therefore, so long as there
was any evidence to support a verdict in favor of the Common-
wealth, the trial court's findings had to be upheld.'
The evidence surrounding Shawn's confession was substan-
tial."'6  Unfortunately for Shawn, that evidence could be
130. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 422 (1984).
131. Brief, supra note 7, at 7.
132. Novak, 457 S.E.2d at 407 (quoting Stansbury v. California, 114 S. Ct. 1526,
1528 (1994) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983))).
133. Novak, 457 S.E.2d at 408.
134. Id. "In our review of this issue, we again consider 'the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party' below, the Commonwealth in this in-
stance,... and 'are bound by the trial court's subsidiary factual findings unless
those findings are plainly wrong.'" Id. (quoting Wilson v. Commonwealth, 413 S.E.2d
655, 656 (Va. Ct. App. 1992)).
135. Id. at 408-09.
Here, the trial court found the defendant "highly intelligent" and "articu-
late in his answers to the questions." He noted from the video tape of
the interview that defendant was "smoking cigarettes," "taking refresh-
ment," "smiling," and "obviously in complete control of himself," "with a
full understanding of the interview process and what was being said and
why he was there." . . . [These findings are] well supported by the re-
cord.
Id.
136. Id
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viewed and analyzed in a number of ways. 137 For instance, the
defense argued that Shawn had no previous experience with the
criminal justice system, because he had no previous petitions
filed against him. 1 8 The court however, viewed the four prior
questioning sessions with the police as "previous experience
with the legal system."1 39 While the defense argued that
Shawn was extremely immature and suffered from emotional
problems, the court analyzed his educational background which
indicated a solid tenth grade education. "
The defense pointed out that on a number of occasions, the
police officer investigating the murders lied to Shawn and his
mother about facts surrounding the murders.'"
Detective Hoffman admitted that ... he lied to Shawn
about police observations on the day of the search; he
lied... about the presence of a witness who saw [Shawn]
walking with the two victims; and he lied when he indicat-
ed ... that the police had a new laser technology which
enabled them to secure fingerprints from cloth and that
Shawn's prints were on the boys' clothing.'
In response, the court merely reiterated its holding in Johnson
v. Commonwealth by stating that:
While a deliberate falsehood by a police officer in the course
of his duties may undermine the respect that significant
segments of the public may have for law enforcement and
the system of justice, a lie on the part of an interrogating
police officer does not, in and of itself, require a finding
that a resulting confession was involuntary. Nothing in this
record suggests that deception by Hoffman compelled
defendant's ... confession, against his will and without
choice."
137. Id.
138. Brief, supra note 7, at 23.
139. Novak, 457 S.E.2d at 408.
140. Brief, supra note 7, at 5. But cf Novak, 457 S.E.2d at 408-09. It is important
to note that a tenth grade education is substantially higher than any of the educa-
tion levels seen in the previous five cases. Id.
141. Brief, supra note 7, at 21.
142. Id. at 4.
143. Novak, 457 S.E.2d at 409.
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The defense also argued that Shawn's surroundings were
inherently coercive.' 4 He was questioned at the police station
three out of five times, often without the presence of his moth-
er.'" During his final interrogation, Detective Hoffman per-
suaded Mrs. Novak to leave the room by lying to her about the
questions he intended to ask Shawn.' After she left, the offi-
cer positioned himself between Shawn and the door and moved
close enough to Shawn so that their knees were almost touch-
ing.'47 The defense felt that this movement was enough to
make Shawn feel trapped and intimidated, and therefore it was
coercive.' The defense continued by arguing that Shawn was
increasingly the focus of the murder investigation with the
passage of each day.' The court, however, felt that because
the "interview was conducted in a carpeted room, approximately
ten-by-twelve, furnished with a table and several chairs," there
was no coercion involved. 5 ' The court noted that Shawn ap-
peared calm and comfortable, and that "until the confession,
[he] was permitted to move about the building and was free to
leave at anytime."'5'
The court concluded that "[t]his evidence, considered with the
entire record, including a video tape of the interview in issue,
provided abundant support for the trial court's determination
that defendant was not in custody at the time of his initial
admission of guilt and prior Miranda warnings were, thus,
unnecessary."52
144. Brief, supra note 7, at 10.
145. 1&
146. Id. at 3.
147. Id. at 4. At this time, Detective Hoffman began questioning Shawn more in-
tently. Hoffman stated: "Shawn. You can talk to me. Don't be afraid. Get it out.
Don't be afraid . . . You killed them, didn't you?" Id. at 23.
148. Id. at 10.
149. Id Shawn was initially questioned on Wednesday, March 6, 1991. He was
first questioned at his house in the afternoon. Later that same evening, he was ques-
tioned at the police station. Shawn was questioned again at his home on Thursday
afternoon and then again in the evening. During the questioning, inconsistencies de-
veloped between what Shawn said and the information gathered from other witnesses.
Therefore, Shawn and his mother were asked to come to the police station for further
questioning on Saturday morning. It was at this session that Shawn confessed. Id. at
2.
150. Novak, 457 S.E.2d at 408.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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The circumstances surrounding Shawn's confession included
multiple factors from the previous Virginia cases discussed
above; factors which in those cases, standing by themselves,
were not enough to overturn the defendant's conviction. It
would seem from Shawn's case that even multiple factors with-
in a single case are not enough to overturn a juvenile's convic-
tion. It is for this reason that Shawn's case represents the clos-
est a Virginia appellate court has come to completely eliminat-
ing the "special caution" required under In re Gault.
V. THE RELIABILITY OF JUVENILE CONFESSIONS
Whether one agrees or disagrees that Shawn was not yet in
custodial interrogation, and therefore not entitled to Miranda
warnings, his case provides a perfect example of the many
questions that surround the questioning of juvenile defendants
and the confessions given by them. Many scholars believe that
a bright line standard should be adopted to govern questioning
of juveniles like Shawn by police and other law enforcement
personnel.'53  Several empirical studies of juveniles' under-
standing of their constitutional rights during police interroga-
tion reveal that a great majority of juveniles are incapable of
understanding, let alone waiving, their Constitutional rights.
One study conducted in Virginia examined the ability of 115
learning disabled and non-learning disabled youths from five
high schools in four eastern Virginia school districts." In this
study, "[t]he teenagers had special problems in understanding
the role [of] and time for intervention by a lawyer if asserting
their right to an attorney."'55 "Some youths believed that the
admonition that anything said could be used against them
meant that any disrespectful words directed to the police would
153. See Brief, supra note 7, at 24. "Standards promulgated by various national
bodies have universally recommend[ed] the adoption of a bright line standard to gov-
ern such police questioning." Id.
154. See Brief, supra note 7, at 28 (reporting on Barbara A. Zaremba, Comprehen-
sion of Miranda Rights by 14-18 Year Old African-American and Caucasian Males
With and Without Learning Disabilities (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, School
of Education, College of William and Mary)).
155. Id. at 28-29. "Many [of the teenagers] equated an attorney with a social work-
er, and some believed that their invocation of the right to counsel would entitle them
to a lawyer 'when I go to court.'" Id.
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be reported to the judge.""6 This study also revealed that age
was not a significant factor in improving the students' compre-
hension of their constitutional rights."' Also, the presence of
a learning disability did not make a large impact on the level
of understanding: even "non-learning disabled students per-
formed below the acceptable level of comprehension."' 8
Earlier research corroborates these results. In 1969, a study
in San Diego tested ninety youths and scored their ability to
understand and then knowingly and intelligently waive their
Miranda rights.'59 In the study, "eighty-six of ninety juveniles
freely and voluntarily waived their constitutional rights.""6 Of
those eighty-six, only five received an understanding score of
ten.'5 ' In other words, eighty-one of the youths who freely
waived their rights "did not consciously and fully understand
[those] rights."62
A third study on this subject was completed in 1981. '63 Af-
ter extensive investigation of juveniles' level of understanding of
their Miranda rights, the author concluded:
[T]he great majority of juveniles who are 14 years of age or
younger were seen in this project to lack the competence to
waive rights to silence and counsel. The results also indi-
cate that the competence of juveniles who are 15-16 years
of age should be questioned when the juvenile is black and
of lower socioeconomic status, or has had little contact with
police in relation to felony charges, or might manifest intel-
lectual functioning which is well below average on an intel-
ligence test (that is, an IQ of less than 80).'
156. Brief, supra note 7, at 29.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. A. Bruce Ferguson & Alan C. Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 39 (1970).
160. Id. at 53.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. GRISsO, JUVENILE'S WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPE-
TENCE 8 (1981) (the purpose of the test was "to provide empirical information with
which police, lawyers, judges, and legislative lawmakers could address the question of
juvenile's competence to waive Miranda rights.").
164. Id. at 203-04.
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The results of each of these studies lead to the inevitable
conclusion "that juveniles [should] be extended far greater
protections than those customarily accorded to adults in interro-
gation settings."165 In fact, various national bodies with con-
siderable experience in juvenile justice matters have promul-
gated standards designed to afford that level of special protec-
tion. For example, the Task Force on Juvenile Justice and De-
linquency Prevention of the National Advisory Committee on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals recommends the follow-
ing:
When police are conducting a custodial investigation of
an individual who is legally a juvenile, they should take
care not to allow that juvenile to waive the right against
self-incrimination without the advice of counsel. During
interviews or interrogations, as in all police procedures,
police officers must be sensitive to and respect the basic
constitutional rights and personal dignity of both juveniles
and adults. Police officers must scrupulously avoid practices
that could be described as inherently coercive in the sense
that a person may cooperate or confess to unlawful conduct
as a result of induced fear.166
The National Advisory Committee for Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention of the United States Department of
Justice also developed a standard for the questioning and inter-
rogation of juveniles. 16 ' This standard includes the following:
165. Brief, supra note 7, at 29.
Juveniles are deemed to lack the legal capacity to make wills, enter into
contracts enforceable against them, marry without parental permission, or
engage in any number of important activities. And yet they are presumed
capable of waiving important constitutional rights during a police interro-
gation which may, as in [Shawn Novak's case], expose a sixteen-year-old
youth to the awful possibility of execution in Virginia's electric chair.
Id.
166. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, TASK FORCE ON JUVE-
NILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, STANDARD 5.8: GUIDELINES FOR INTER-
ROGATION AND WAIVER OF THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 212 (1976).
167. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, STANDARDS FOR THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, STANDARD 2.247 (1980).
Juveniles accused of committing a delinquent offense or engaging in non-
criminal misbehavior should not be questioned regarding such offenses or
such conduct, and formal oral or written statements by those juveniles
should not be accepted, unless [Miranda warnings have] been explained
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No statement made by any juvenile while in the custody of
a law enforcement officer shall be admissible against the
juvenile as part of the government's case-in-chief, unless
such statement was made either in the presence of a parent
or other adult ... or in the presence of the juvenile's attor-
ney. 1
It is clear from these standards, promulgated by experts in
the field of juvenile justice, that there is still a need for the
"special caution" mandated by the Supreme Court in In re
Gault. Bright line standards such as these would help to pro-
tect the rights of juveniles, while also helping to lessen the
amount of confusing and frustrating litigation surrounding this
issue.
VI. CONCLUSION
Until standards like those discussed above are adopted and
enforced in Virginia, cases like Novak will continue to frustrate
those who are concerned with the process of interrogating juve-
niles. If the Supreme Court of Virginia continues down the
same path it began in Harris and Thomas, there seems to be
little chance for reversal in a case dealing with a juvenile con-
fession. Without a bright line rule to rely upon, the courts are
simply unable to overturn a trial court conviction when there is
evidence in the record which supports the fact that a juvenile
defendant waived his Miranda rights. This inability to reverse
exists even when the juvenile was never read his rights in the
first place. Therefore, in future cases similar to those discussed
above, the best argument remains to convince the court of the
distinguishable circumstances surrounding each case from its
counterparts. The court must be convinced that the totality of
the circumstances indicates that the juvenile was, in fact, en-
gaged in custodial interrogation with the police. If the court
finds that the police fully complied with Miranda, then the
in language understandable by the juvenile.... [TIhe juvenile [also] has
a right to have present his/her parent, guardian, or primary caretaker, or
another adult who is within a reasonable distance and with whom the
juvenile has significant ties.
Id.
168. Id.
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juvenile's only hope is to convince the court that his confession
was not voluntary. This involves once again the use of the
totality of the circumstances test; a test which the appellate
courts of Virginia have not frequently used for the purpose of
protecting juveniles in the manner prescribed in In re Gault.
Ellen R. Fulmer
